FALSAFAH INSAN

FALSAFAH INSAN

PERBEZAAN FAHAM ILMU DI ANTARA IMĀM AL-GHAZZĀLĪ DENGAN SARJANA BARAT – 2

Muhammad Afiq Abdul Rahman (Malaysia)

SAMBUNGAN DARI BAHAGIAN 1

Dalam Posterior Analytics, Aristotle mengemukakan bahawa semua pengajaran (didaskalia) dan pembelajaran (mathesis) yang melibatkan pemikiran (dianoetike) adalah bersumberkan apa yang telah maklum (prouparchouses gignetai gnoseos). Namun di sini Aristotle menyatakan gnoseos kepada ilmu perbahasan walaupun dinyatakannya mengambil kira segala cawangan ilmu.

“All teaching and learning that involves the use of reason proceeds from pre-existent knowledge. This is evident if we consider all the different branches of learning, because both the mathematical sciences and every other art are acquired this way. Similarly too with logical arguments, whether syllogistic or inductive; both effect instructions by means of facts already recognized, the former making assumptions as though granted by an intelligent audience, and the latter proving the universal from the self-evident nature of the particular.” (Posterior Analytics, Harvard)

Dalam Maqāṣid al-Falāsifah, Imām al-Ghazzālī menyatakan terdapat cara untuk mengetahui bersumberkan apa yang tidak maklum (kashf haqīqīya) yang nilai ilmunya tiadapat ditimbang menerusi logik (kashf tasawwurat). Perolehannya bergantung kepada kesempurnaan jiwa (takmil al-nafs). Kesempurnaan ini terdapat dua wajah iaitu pengecapan dan penyucian. Penyucian jiwa (al-tazkīyyah) melibatkan pembersihan jiwa (tahirha) dari sifat mazmumah dan menerapkan sifat mahmudah, yang membuahkan pengecapan (taba’) yang jamilah dari Haqaiq Ilahīyyah pada mahiyyah insan dan seluruh kewujudannya.

“Now that it has been established that the unknown follows only from the known, it must be understood that not every unknown will result from every known, but for every known there is a particular known which is related to it. There is a method of bringing it into the intellect and this method makes the unknown known. That which yields affirming conceptual knowledge is called definition or description. And that which leads to affirming knowledge is called argumentation. To the latter belong the syllogism, induction example, etc. Every definition and every syllogism is divided into that which is true, and gives certainty, and that which is false, but resembles truth. Therefore the knowledge of logic will furnish us (kashf tassawurat) with the criteria by which we may distinguish between the sound and the unsound definition, syllogism, so that by it we may distinguish between certain and uncertain knowledge. But you cannot differentiate increase from decrease, gain from loss, in knowledge which is not weight on these scales. You might demur and say that, the value of logic is that it discriminates between knowledge and ignorance—or what value is knowledge? The answer is that all value are contemptible compared with eternal bliss, which is the ultimate bliss and depends on the perfection of the soul. This perfection is of a two-fold character: ornamentation and purification. Purification consists of cleansing (the soul) of mean virtues and ridding it of vices. Ornamentation consists of engraving on the soul the ornament of truth, so that there will be revealed to it the divine truths, nay the whole of existence in its proper order, with a complete and true knowledge corresponding to reality, free from ignorance and error. It is like the mirror…” (Maqāṣid al-Falāsifah, terj. Chertoff dari terj. Hebrew, The Meaning of Philosophers, Columbia University)

Perbandingan antara Imām al-Ghazzālī dengan St. Thomas Aquinas

Dalam bahagian pertama Summa Theologiae, St. Thomas Aquinas menyatakan dua sanggahan berkenaan soalan “Whether sacred doctrine is nobler than other sciences?”:

Objection 1: It seems that sacred doctrine (sacra doctrina) is not nobler (non sit dignior) than other sciences (scientiis); for the nobility of a science (dignitatem scientiae) depends on the certitude (certitudo) it establishes. But other sciences, the principles of which cannot be doubted (principiis dubitari non potest), seem to be more certain (esse certiores) than sacred doctrine; for its principles—namely, articles of faith (articuli fidei)—can be doubted (dubitationem recipiunt). Therefore other sciences seem to be nobler (ista digniores).

Objection 2: Further, it is the sign of a lower science (inferioris scientiae) to depend upon a higher (superiori); as music (musicus) depends on arithmetic (arithmetico). But sacred doctrine does in a sense depend upon philosophical sciences (philosophicis disciplinis); for Jerome observes, in his Epistle to Magnus, that “the ancient doctors (doctores antiqui) so enriched their books with the ideas and phrases of the philosophers (philosophorum doctrinis), that thou knowest not what more to admire (admirari) in them, their profane erudition (eruditionem saeculi) or their scriptural learning (scientiam Scripturarum).” Therefore sacred doctrine is inferior to other sciences.

On the contrary, Other sciences are called the handmaidens (ancillae) of this one: “Wisdom sent her maids to invite to the tower.” (Prov. 9:3).

Kemudian St. Thomas Aquinas menjelaskan jawapan umumnya seperti berikut:

I answer that, Since this science is partly speculative (quantum ad aliquid sit speculativa) and partly practical (quantum ad aliquid sit practica), it transcends all others speculative and practical. Now one speculative science is said to be nobler (dignior) than another, either by reason of its greater certitude (certitudinem), or by reason of the higher worth of its subject-matter (dignitatem materiae). In both these respects this science (scientia) surpasses other speculative sciences (speculativas scientias excedit); in point of greater certitude, because other sciences derive their certitude from the natural light of human reason (habent ex naturali lumine rationis humanae), which can err; whereas this derives its certitude from the light of divine knowledge (habet ex lumine divinae scientiae), which cannot be misled: in point of the higher worth of its subject-matter because this science treats chiefly of those things which by their sublimity transcend human reason (altitudine rationem transcendunt); while other sciences consider only those things which are within reason’s grasp (rationi subduntur). Of the practical sciences (practicarum vero scientiarum), that one is nobler which is ordained to a further purpose (ulteriorem finem ordinatur), as political science is nobler than military science; for the good of the army (civilis militari) is directed to the good of the State (civitatis ordinatur). But the purpose (finis autem) of this science, in so far as it is practical, is eternal bliss (beatitudo aeterna); to which as to an ultimate end the purposes (ultimum finem) of every practical science (scientiarum practicarum) are directed. Hence it is clear that from every standpoint, it is nobler (digniorem) than other sciences.

Jawapan umum tersebut diikuti dengan balasan St. Thomas Aquinas kepada sanggahan pertama dan kedua seperti berikut:

Reply to Objection 1. It may well happen that what is in itself the more certain (certius) may seem to us the less certain (minus certum) on account of the weakness of our intelligence (intellectus nostri), “which is dazzled by the clearest objects of nature (manifestissima naturae); as the owl is dazzled by the light of the sun” (Metaph. ii, lect. i). Hence the fact that some happen to doubt (dubitatio) about articles of faith is not due to the uncertain nature of the truths (incertitudinem rei), but to the weakness of human intelligence (debilitatem intellectus humani); yet the slenderest knowledge (haberi de cognitione) that may be obtained of the highest things (altissimarum) is more desirable than the most certain knowledge (certissima cognitio) obtained of lesser things (habetur de minimis), as is said in de Animalibus xi.

Reply to Objection 2. This science can in a sense depend upon the philosophical sciences, not as though it stood in need of them, but only in order to make its teaching clearer. For it accepts its principles not from other sciences, but immediately from God, by revelation (Deo per revelationem). Therefore it does not depend upon other sciences as upon the higher, but makes use of them as of the lesser, and as handmaidens (ancillis): even so the master sciences make use of the sciences that supply their materials, as political of military science. That it thus uses them is not due to its own defect or insufficiency, but to the defect of our intelligence, which is more easily led by what is known through natural reason (naturalem rationem) (from which proceed the other sciences) to that which is above reason (supra rationem), such as are the teachings of this science.

St. Thomas Aquinas menggunakan istilah dignior, dignitatem, digniorem yang sebahagiannya bersandarkan kepada habent ex naturali lumine rationis humanae dan sebahagiannya lagi bersandarkan kepada habet ex lumine divinae scientiae. Di sini rationi subduntur tiada hubungan dengan divinae scientiae. Tetapi sebagai ancillae, divinae scientiae yang bersumberkan Deo per revelationem menggunakan speculativas scientias untuk menjelaskan sacra doctrina. Beatitudo aeterna pula hanya menjadi tujuan scientiarum practicarum, tidak bagi speculativas scientias.

Dalam Kitāb al-‘Ilm dari Iḥyā’ ‘Ulūm al-Dīn, Imām al-Ghazzālī dalam al-shawāhid al-‘aqlīyyah (sandaran akal) menyatakan sesuatu yang nafīs (bernilai) yang dituntut itu ada tiga bahagian iaitu pertamanya (1) yang dituntut kerana lighairihi, kedua (2) yang dituntut kerana lidzatihi, dan ketiga (3) yang dituntut kerana kedua-duanya. Yang lidzatihi adalah ashraf (terpuji) dan afdal (terbaik). Misalnya, dinar dan dirham dituntut kerana hasilnya dapat membeli barangan lain, sedangkan dinar dan dirham hanyalah kepingan besi yang sama nilainya dengan batu kerikil jika tidak diberi nilainya oleh Allāh. Manakala yang dituntut kerana lidzatihi adalah sa‘adah (kebahagiaan dan kesejahteraan) di hari akhirat dan lidzati’n-nazhira (memandang dzat) wajah Allāh Ta’āla. Yang dituntut kerana kedua-duanya pula adalah menjaga kesihatan dan menuntut ilmu.

و اعلم: أن الشيء النفيس المرغوب فيه ينقسم إلى ما يطلب لغيره، و إلى ما يطلب لذاته، و إلى ما يطلب لغيره و لذاته جميعا فما يطلب لذاته أشرف وأفضل مما يطلب لغيره والمطلوب لغيره الدراهم والدنانير فإنهما حجران لا منفعة لهما ولولا أن الله سبحانه وتعالى يسر قضاء الحاجات بهما لكانا والحصباء بمثابة واحدة والذي يطلب لذاته فالسعادة في الآخرة ولذة النظر لوجه الله تعالى والذي يطلب لذاته ولغيره.

(Iḥyā’ ‘Ulūm al-Dīn, Dar Ibn Hazm)

Imām al-Ghazzālī menggunakan istilah al-nafīs bagi menyatakan maksud nilai. Perkataan ini berakar kepada nafs yang merupakan satu aspek diri manusia yang terlibat dalam mentadbir badan, selain ruh, kalbu dan akal. Di sini Imām al-Ghazzālī menghubungkan akal iaitu aspek diri manusia yang terlibat dalam pemikiran dengan nafs dan menyandarkannya kepada Allāh. Istilah ashraf dan afdal digunakan bagi makna kata lidzatihi yang merujuk kepada nilai di hari akhirat bersandarkan kepada Allāh, dan lighairihi bersandarkan nilainya kepada Allāh.

Penutup

Seharusnya Imām al-Ghazzālī tidak diturunkan tarafnya kepada Descartes dan Descartes juga tidak seharusnya dinaikkan taraf menyamai Imām al-Ghazzālī. Di abad pertengahan Eropah transmisi teks dari Tamadun Islam ke Barat berlaku dengan pesat dan sarjana Barat melakukan penyusunan semula bukan mengambil manfaat daripada teks Islam tetapi mengubah rupa dan citanya bersalahan dengan prinsip asal. Berdasarkan rumusan di atas, Descartes bermula dengan keraguan, manakala Imām al-Ghazzālī bermula dengan keyakinan, yang bermaksud kedua-duanya berbeza dalam prinsip ilmu.

Istilah gnoseos yang dinyatakan Aristotle bukan kashf (penyingkapan) yang dimaksudkan oleh Imām al-Ghazzālī, manakala notitiam yang dikemukakan Descartes adalah pengusiran kashf dari sumber ilmu yang sah. Maksudnya sumber ilmu Imām al-Ghazzālī yang berdasarkan Haqaiq Ilahīyyah adalah berbeza dengan sumber ilmu Aristotle yang menyempitkan sumber ilmu, dan berbeza dengan sumber ilmu Descartes yang menutup pintu ilmu.

Istilah dignior, dignitatem, digniorem yang digunakan oleh St. Thomas Aquinas merujuk kepada bidang-bidang ilmu. Ini berbeza maksudnya dengan istilah al-nafīs yang merujuk kepada diri manusia, bukan sekadar bidang-bidang ilmu. Istilah sa‘adah pula merujuk kepada dua dimensi iaitu dunia dan akhirat seperti menjaga kesihatan dan menuntut ilmu. Ini adalah berbeza dengan speculativas scientias yang menyingkirkan beatitudo aeterna daripada tujuannya.  

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